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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from Plaintiffs’ purchase of common 
units1 in Defendant StoneMor Partners L.P.’s (“StoneMor”) 
business.2  The District Court granted StoneMor’s motion to 
dismiss, primarily because Plaintiffs’ allegations of securities 
fraud were found immaterial in light of Defendants’ related 
disclosures.  For the reasons explained below, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
StoneMor sells products and services for funerals, 
including burial plots and related products.  StoneMor is 
required by state law to hold in trust a percentage of proceeds 
from customers who purchase funeral products and services 
prior to their death.  These “pre-need sales” are released to 
StoneMor when the services are finally delivered to the 
customer—that is, upon the customer’s death.  Under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), pre-
need sales that are stuck in trusts may not be represented as 
current revenue.   
During the Class Period, StoneMor executed successful 
acquisitions of death-care properties, which in turn increased 
its pre-need sales.  These pre-need sales, however, could not 
be demonstrated as an increase in current revenue since the 
proceeds were held in trusts.  Thus, as pre-need sales grew, so 
too did a substantial disparity between StoneMor’s overall 
                                                 
1 StoneMor is a master limited partnership whose publicly 
traded securities are referred to as “units,” which are traded 
similarly to shares of stock.  
 
2 Plaintiffs are Peter Fan, Royal Estate Management LLC, and 
Fremont Hotel Inc., who propose to represent a putative class 
of similarly situated individuals and entities that purchased 
StoneMor units between March 15, 2012 and October 27, 
2016 (the “Class Period”).  Defendants include StoneMor, 
StoneMor G.P., StoneMor G.P. Holdings and its majority 
owner American Cemeteries Infrastructure Investors, LLC, 
and the controlling shareholder executives (“Defendants”).   
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sales and its accessible cash—cash which would have 
otherwise been used for quarterly investor distributions. 
To address this disparity, StoneMor did three things.  
First, along with its standard GAAP financials, it issued non-
GAAP financials to its investors that represented pre-need 
sales as a portion of present-day current revenue.  Second, it 
borrowed cash to distribute to investors the proceeds of pre-
need sales in the same quarter the sale was made, rather than 
waiting until the cash was released from trust.  Lastly, it used 
proceeds from equity sales to pay down the borrowed cash that 
funded distributions to investors while pre-need sales remained 
in trust.  Thus, a feedback loop was created: cash distributions 
were funded by borrowed cash, that borrowed cash was paid 
down through equity proceeds, and equity proceeds were 
continuously attracted through growing pre-need sales and 
cash distributions.   
This loop was disrupted, however, on September 2, 
2016, when StoneMor announced that it would restate about 
three years of previously-reported financial statements.  Under 
GAAP regulations, StoneMor was temporarily prohibited from 
selling units and receiving corresponding equity proceeds.  
Plaintiffs allege that this prohibition caused StoneMor’s 
October 27, 2016 unit distribution to fall by nearly half; 
StoneMor blamed the distribution cut on salesforce issues.  
Regardless, once the news of StoneMor’s reduced distributions 
broke, its unit price dropped by 45%.  Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiffs filed suit on November 21, 2016, alleging violations 
of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5.   
In short, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made false 
or misleading statements, with scienter, which Plaintiffs relied 
on to their financial detriment.  Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss the Complaint, which the District Court granted for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), and for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading 
standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.  For the reasons discussed below, 
we will affirm. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and § 78aa.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
“We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and ‘we apply the same test as the 
district court.’”  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 
261, 266 (3d Cir. 2005).  We may affirm a dismissal on any 
ground supported by the record.  Hassen v. Gov’t of Virgin 
Islands, 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 
III. 
 
 Under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), when selling securities 
it is illegal for any person “[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”  
In order to state a claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate: 
(1) A material misrepresentation (or omission); 
(2) scienter (a wrongful state of mind); 
(3) a connection between the misstatement and the 
purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance upon the misstatement; 
(5) economic loss; and 
(6) loss causation. 
See City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. 
Corp, 908 F.3d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 2018).  Because they allege 
fraud, Plaintiffs “must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b).   
Moreover, in this securities fraud action, the PSLRA 
imposes greater particularity requirements concerning alleged 
material misrepresentations and scienter.  A complaint must 
“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation . . . is made on information and belief . . . all facts on 
which that belief is formed.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).  
Concerning scienter, a complaint must “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).  
The PSLRA’s heightened standard exists “to curb frivolous, 
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lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to 
recover on meritorious claims.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).   
 
A. 
 
Plaintiffs base their claim of fraud on three categories3 
of alleged misstatements by Defendants.  First, Plaintiffs claim 
that StoneMor fraudulently lauded its financial strength or 
health in connection with the release of certain quarterly 
distributions.  For example, in a press release discussing 
distribution increases in September of 2012, StoneMor stated: 
 
We determine the distribution 
based on the operating 
performance of the company and 
the resultant Available Cash at the 
end of the quarter.  StoneMor has 
consistently paid quarterly 
distributions since its initial public 
offering in September 2004 using 
this distribution policy and intends 
to continue this policy into the 
future.  Given the solid 
performance this year so far and 
what we expect will be continued 
good performance, we are 
comfortable with affirming our 
distribution of at least $0.585 per 
unit through the end of the year. 
 
J.A. 335.  Plaintiffs allege that this statement is false and 
misleading because StoneMor “could not, and never intended 
to fund the distributions from the performance of the business, 
i.e., from day-to-day business operations.”  Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint (“CCAC”) ¶ 139.  Plaintiffs argue that 
StoneMor fraudulently omitted that its “ability to fund cash 
                                                 
3 Plaintiffs alleged a fourth category of statements in their 
Complaint—certification statements required by statute.  
CCAC ¶¶ 196-97.  Plaintiffs have not, however, appealed the 
District Court’s finding that these statements were not false 
and misleading.  Appellant Br. 15 n. 8. 
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distributions was contingent on its access to the capital 
markets.”  Id.   
 The second category of alleged misstatements relate to 
the connection between StoneMor’s operations and 
distributions.  For example, StoneMor stated in a press release 
that its “primary source of cash from which to pay partner 
distributions . . . is operating cash flow.”  Id. ¶ 134 (emphasis 
omitted).  Plaintiffs argue that statements such as this 
misrepresented the fact that StoneMor’s primary source of 
liquid cash for distributions was equity proceeds.   
 The third category of alleged misstatements concern 
StoneMor’s ability to pay down its debt facility using equity 
proceeds.  For example, a StoneMor press release stated that 
“StoneMor intends to use the net proceeds from the common 
units it is offering to pay down the borrowings outstanding 
under its existing credit facility.”  Id. ¶ 143 (emphasis omitted).  
Plaintiffs allege that this statement is misleading because 
StoneMor allegedly omitted the fact that its cash distributions 
were funded through borrowings from its credit facility.   
 
1. Falsity and Materiality 
 
In this securities fraud case, these statements are only 
actionable if, “when read in light of all the information then 
available to the market or a failure to disclose particular 
information, [they] conveyed a false or misleading 
impression.”  In re Bell Atl. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 91-0514 et 
al., 1997 WL 205709, at *23 n.86 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 1997), 
aff’d, 142 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1998).  A false or misleading 
statement, however, is not enough.  We must also find that the 
alleged misstatement or omission is material. 
Materiality may be found when certain information, if 
disclosed, “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the total mix of information 
available to that investor.”  In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 
F.3d 696, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
449 (1976).  We conduct this review from the objective 
perspective of a reasonable investor.  Omnicare, Inc. v. 
Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. 
Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015).  As such, “vague and general statements 
of optimism” are non-actionable precisely because they are not 
material—a reasonable investor would not base decisions on 
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such statements.  See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 
525, 538-39 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by 
Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308. 
Finally, when considering whether an alleged 
misstatement is material, we pay particular attention to whether 
or not Defendants sufficiently disclosed facts and information 
that would render the alleged misrepresentations not 
misleading.  See Ieradi v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 599 
(3d Cir. 2000).  This case turns on Plaintiffs’ allegations that 
StoneMor omitted necessary information that would have 
alerted investors to its methods for funding its distributions.  
For this reason, we focus primarily on the specific disclosures 
made by StoneMor that relate to Plaintiffs’ alleged 
misstatements.  And, as we discuss below, for each category of 
alleged misstatements, StoneMor disclosed sufficient 
information to render them immaterial. 
 
i. 
 
 Plaintiffs’ first category of alleged misstatements 
claimed that StoneMor fraudulently lauded its financial health 
and misrepresented that its distributions were funded “from the 
performance of the business, i.e., from day-to-day business 
operations.”  CCAC ¶ 139.  Indeed, the crux of Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint is that StoneMor “obscured the fact that [it] paid the 
distribution from its revolving credit facility, which was in turn 
paid down through the proceeds of a series of equity offerings.”  
CCAC ¶ 2.  But this information was readily and consistently 
disclosed by StoneMor. 
 In its Form 10-Ks issued during the Class Period, 
StoneMor defined its “Available Cash” as consisting of “cash 
on hand at the end of that quarter, plus cash on hand from 
working capital borrowings made after the end of the quarter . 
. . less cash reserves.”  J.A. 311.  This definition of Available 
Cash demonstrates that, at the outset, a reasonable investor 
would be informed that StoneMor’s distributions were funded 
by more than just its operating revenue.  Moreover, StoneMor 
repeatedly disclosed the risks it faced in its business, stating in 
its 2012 Form 10-K that it “may not have sufficient cash from 
operations to continue paying distributions at their current 
level, or at all,” and that its “substantial level of indebtedness 
could materially adversely affect [its] ability to generate 
sufficient cash for distribution to [its] unitholders, to fulfill [its] 
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debt obligations and to operate [its] business.”  J.A. 347 
(emphasis omitted).  This disclosure, among others, would 
alert reasonable investors to the real business risks facing 
StoneMor.  Thus, these statements Plaintiffs identify as 
fraudulently misleading are rendered immaterial given the 
pertinent disclosures.  See Ieradi, 230 F.3d at 599-600 
(discussing how disclosures present in Defendant’s Form 10-
Qs were sufficient to alert a reasonable investor to the relevant 
risks). 
 
ii. 
 
 Plaintiffs’ second category of alleged misstatements 
concerns the fact that StoneMor’s distributions were funded in 
large part through its cash borrowings, and not its day-to-day 
operating revenue.  But this information was also readily and 
repeatedly disclosed. 
 In each of its annual reports during the Class Period, 
StoneMor issued GAAP and non-GAAP financials side-by-
side, which demonstrated the mathematical reality that 
StoneMor was not able to fund its distributions primarily from 
its day-to-day operations because much of that cash was being 
held in state trusts and was unrecognized by GAAP.  See e.g., 
J.A. 357; See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 
1100, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that publicly-traded 
companies may use non-GAAP reports if presented with at 
least equal prominence (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m; 17 C.F.R. § 
229.10)).  StoneMor was transparent in this accounting 
method, and even used a bar chart at a 2013 investor 
presentation that represented its distribution amount and non-
GAAP operating profits towering over its GAAP operating 
profit.  CCAC ¶ 155.  When viewed alongside these 
disclosures, Plaintiffs’ allegations that StoneMor fraudulently 
concealed the fact that its distributions were not funded 
primarily from the current operating revenue fall flat.  
StoneMor’s disclosures render any such perceived 
misstatement immaterial. 
 
iii. 
 
 The third category of alleged misrepresentations relates 
to StoneMor’s usage of equity proceeds as a means to pay 
down its debt facility from which it borrowed cash for 
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distributions.  Here too, StoneMor’s disclosures are sufficient 
to render these allegations immaterial. 
 Indeed, Plaintiffs’ own Complaint quotes from 
StoneMor press releases that state clearly that “StoneMor 
intend[ed] to use the net proceeds from the [equity] offering to 
pay down outstanding indebtedness under its revolving credit 
facility.”  CCAC ¶ 176; accord id. ¶¶ 179, 184, 186 (emphasis 
omitted).  The Complaint also references a 2016 Quarterly 
Report, which describes a successful public offering and 
explains that the “proceeds from the offering were used to pay 
down outstanding indebtedness under the Credit Facility.”  
CCAC ¶ 189 (emphasis omitted).  In light of these disclosures, 
we cannot conclude that the statements contained in Plaintiffs’ 
third category of alleged misrepresentations are material 
because a reasonable investor would have been aware of the 
fact that StoneMor used equity proceeds to pay down its debt. 
 Overall, for each category of StoneMor’s alleged 
misstatements, clear and consistent disclosures were made 
available to investors throughout the Class Period.  As a result, 
we hold that StoneMor sufficiently disclosed facts and 
information that render its alleged misrepresentations not 
misleading.  See Ieradi, 230 F.3d at 599. 
 
2. Scienter 
 
Even if we were to hold that StoneMor’s alleged 
misrepresentations were materially misleading, Plaintiffs’ 
claims would still fail because our review of the record does 
not demonstrate the necessary state of mind by Defendants.  In 
line with its heightened pleading standards, the PSLRA 
requires that the plaintiff’s pleadings conjure a “strong 
inference” that the defendant acted with the necessary state of 
mind, that is, with intent to defraud shareholders.  15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(b)(2)(A).  Scienter may also be shown by a “knowing or 
reckless state of mind,” which in this securities context would 
be demonstrated by pleading “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care.”  Institutional Inv’rs Grp. v. Avaya, 
Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252, 267 n.42 (3d Cir. 2009).  A strong 
inference of scienter “must be cogent and at least as compelling 
as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”  Tellabs, 
551 U.S. at 314. 
Such an inference is clearly not present here.  For each 
category of statements, as described above, StoneMor’s 
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disclosures draw a strong inference that the investors were 
appraised of the relevant information regarding StoneMor’s 
cycle of equity offerings, cash borrowings, and cash 
distributions.  These disclosures do not demonstrate an intent 
to defraud—rather, they accurately show how StoneMor 
leveraged its assets in order to maximize its distributions 
despite the state trust requirements attached to its pre-need 
sales.  StoneMor may have been caught by the risk inherent in 
its business strategy, but those risks were disclosed in their 
annual Form 10-Ks throughout the Class Period.  Thus, we 
hold that the pleadings do not demonstrate scienter as the 
PSLRA requires. 
 
IV. 
 
While we acknowledge the economic harm suffered by 
StoneMor’s investors, we cannot say that it was the result of 
fraud.  Our holding today simply reaffirms the well-established 
rule that, in a securities fraud case, a defendant’s sufficient 
disclosure of information can render alleged 
misrepresentations immaterial.  This is such a case.  
StoneMor’s disclosures sufficiently informed the reasonable 
investor of the risks inherent in its business, and it is not our 
place to correct the cost of doing business when it meets the 
requirements of the law.   
 
Given the foregoing, we will affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
